Political Conservatism From Motivated Social Cognitive Perspective Psychology Essay

An persons ideological beliefs sing all elements of life, including societal, economic, political, spiritual, and cultural political orientations, may be placed on a continuum runing from flexible to fixed ( Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & A ; Sanford, 1950 ) . Those whose political orientations are flexible and variable are defined as progressives. At the other extreme are conservativists, who hold stiff, inflexible beliefs about their universe. This essay will research the psychological underpinnings of political conservativism through an scrutiny of Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway ‘s ( 2003 ) motivated social-cognitive theory of political conservativism. First, the psychological foundations of political conservativism will be discussed, followed by an scrutiny of the nucleus elements of political conservativism. Several of the cardinal motivational factors thought to play a function in finding the development of conservative beliefs will be investigated. Three extra elements will so be explored ; fright, menace, and uncertainness, and the function of each in the development of conservativism will be evaluated. Finally, the value of such a motivated social-cognitive theory to the research on political conservativism will be considered and possible betterments to this theory will be proposed. These suggestions will be based on thoughts from societal and cognitive positions. It is hoped that this essay will supply a comprehensive history of the value which a motivated social-cognitive theory can convey to the kingdom of political conservativism.

Much psychological research on political conservativism has been carried out within personality psychological science, most notably in the field of single differences. Attempts have been made to place cardinal traits or temperaments which predispose an person to keep conservative political orientations. The bulk of this research has focused on dictatorship. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford ( 1950 ) were the first to analyze the possibility that political conservativism was correlated with a specific personality type: the autocratic personality. Harmonizing to their theory, personality is a important determiner of ideological beliefs. It is assumed that rearing manners, which are influenced by the societal and economic clime, play a major function in personality development. Most notably, they conclude that dictatorship is correlated with political conservativism ( Adorno et al, 1950 ) . In other words, persons who grow up under strict, rough parenting manners are more likely to idealize authorization figures, to penalize perverts and those viewed as a menace to the current societal system ( Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway ‘s 2003 ) . These behaviors are the kernel of conservativism. Altemeyer ‘s ( 1981 ) Right-Wing Authoritarian ( RWA ) theoretical account develops the autocratic personality theory and he besides finds this same relationship. Therefore, it is apparent that personality theories of single difference, peculiarly those on dictatorship, can supply grounds for a relationship between political conservativism and specific variables, therefore offering some account as to why certain people are more immune to alter.

The psychological footing of political conservativism besides comprises epistemological and experiential theories of demands ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . Regulative focal point theory is one illustration. Regulative focal point theory is a motivational rule and is basically an enhanced version of the pleasure-pain rule. It maintains that persons possess two chief self-regulation systems ; a publicity system and a bar system, and these lead to near or avoidance behaviors severally. The publicity system involves self-regulation that is motivated by a desire to accomplish their ends and ideals, and is focused on procuring additions. In contrast, the bar system involves self-regulation that is motivated by duties and duties and by a desire to avoid losingss. Which system one uses will depend on one ‘s set of demands at a given clip ( Higgins, 1997 ) . The cardinal point to be emphasized in the context of this essay is that ‘those in a bar focal point should hold a ‘conservative ‘ response prejudice ‘ . In other words, an person with a bar focal point desires stableness and predictability and are therefore, more likely to keep politically conservative beliefs ( Crowe & A ; Higgins, 1997, p. 1 ) .

One survey competently demonstrates the relationship between a bar focal point system and opposition to alter. Participants were given a undertaking to finish. They were interrupted halfway through this undertaking. After the break, they were given a pick to either continue with the old undertaking, or, to get down a new undertaking. Participants in a bar focal point were more likely than participants in a publicity focal point to take to go on with the old undertaking ( Liberman, Idson, Camacho & A ; Higgins, 1999 ) . This relationship between a bar focal point system and opposition to alter implies that political conservativists are more likely to utilize a bar focal point. Therefore, epistemological and experiential theories of demand aid explicate the strong opposition to alter which is characteristic of politically conservative persons.

The 3rd chief psychological footing for political conservativism involves ideological theories of single and corporate justification and rationalization. Such theories focus less on the person and more on the societal construction, keeping that political conservativism may transport out certain psychological maps for the person ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . One such theory is System Justification Theory. Harmonizing to this theory, persons create political orientations which decrease cognitive disagreement, leting them to warrant the laterality of one group over another in society ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . Therefore, such ideological theories cover both elements of political conservativism: opposition to alter and a justification of inequality. System justification theory predicts that in times of crisis where the social construction is threatened, an addition in political conservativism is likely, as people justify the current system in order to defy alteration, therefore continuing the position quo ( Jost, Banaji & A ; Nosek, 2004 ) .

Harmonizing to Jost and co-workers ( 2003 ) , political conservativism is comprised of two nucleus elements: opposition to alter and justification of inequality ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . Oreg, who developed the Resistance to Change Scale, defines opposition to alter as ‘an person ‘s inclination to defy or avoid devising alterations, to devaluate alteration by and large, and to happen alteration aversive across diverse contexts and types of alteration ‘ ( Oreg, 2003, p. 1 ) . Justification of inequality includes an credence of both economic and societal inequality, and blessing of differentiations between elect groups and the socially disadvantaged groups ( Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan & A ; Shrout, 2007 ) . These two nucleus elements are thought to be stable and fixed, and are the unchanging kernel of political conservativism. It is acknowledged that several other peripheral elements are besides relevant to political conservativism. Peripheral traits are more variable than the nucleus elements, altering as the historical and cultural context alterations. Such traits include a demand for order and consistence, or a inclination to idealize authorization figures. However, Jost and co-workers focus specifically on the two nucleus elements. Both opposition to alter and justification of inequality are viewed as distinguishable elements in their ain right but are by and large positively correlated with each other. It is believed that these two nucleus elements are related to psychological demands which may be cognitive, societal, or motivational in nature ( Jost et al, 2003 ) .

There have been some unfavorable judgments of Jost and co-workers ‘ definition of political conservativism as consisting the two nucleus elements of opposition to alter and justification of inequality. Greenberg and Jonas ( 2003 ) have argued that this definition is debatable when one examines political conservativism played out in existent life state of affairss. In footings of opposition to alter, they claim that many conservativists promote alteration, for illustration Ronald Reagan, and that it is in fact progressives who seem more immune to alter ( Greenberg and Jonas, 2003 ) . While Greenberg and Jones do admit that tolerance of inequality is a nucleus component of political conservativism, they do reason that many broad authoritiess have endorsed unequal policies ( Greenberg and Jonas, 2003 ) . However, despite such unfavorable judgments, the method in which Jost and co-workers ( 2003 ) link both elements to assorted underlying motivations, along with the copiousness of empirical grounds they provide, leads one to believe that they have tapped into the nucleus elements of political conservativism. Besides, in one survey it was found that opposition to alter ( along with regulation following ) predicted political conservativism in both Eastern and Western Europe. Justification of inequality was besides found to foretell political conservativism, if merely in Western Europe ( Thorisdottir et al, 2007 ) .

The primary purpose of the motivated social-cognitive theory of political conservativism is to do connexions between certain psychological motivations and the development of political conservativism. Each of the three theory typologies which comprise the psychological foundations for political conservativism proposes different motivations for the development of politically conservative beliefs. These motivations can be categorized into three different types: epistemological motivations, experiential motivations, and ideological motivations. All motivations are viewed as a agency of cut downing the sum of uncertainness, menace, and fright that an single faces throughout life ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . This essay will sketch the most noteworthy and strongly supported of each class.

Epistemic motivations refer to the methods by which people aim to get beliefs which are definite and reliable. The most persuasive empirical grounds for single differences between progressives and conservativists based on epistemological motivations focal points on mental rigidness and closed-mindedness. This factor can itself be divided into several different motivations, including demand for cognitive closing, intolerance of ambiguity, openness to see, and integrative complexness ( Jost et al, 2003 ) .

Need for cognitive closing is an of import variable to see in analyzing political conservativism. Webster and Kruglanski ( 1994 ) developed the Need for Closure Scale ( NFCS ) . They define the demand for closing as a motivational sensitivity to want a specific reply to a given inquiry instead than ambiguity and uncertainness of information. Need for closing encompasses five different facets: ‘desire for predictability, penchant for order and construction, uncomfortableness with ambiguity, decision, and closed-mindedness ‘ ( Webster & A ; Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1 ) . Kossowska and Van Hiel ( 2003 ) employed the NFCS in a survey which explored the relationship between demand for cognitive closing and conservative beliefs. Need for closing was found to be positively correlated with conservative political orientations in both a Polish sample ( r = .22 ) and a Flemish sample ( r = .52 ) ( Kossowska & A ; Van Hiel, 2003, p. 9 ) .

More specifically, Kemmelmeier ( 1997 ) investigated the relationship between demand for cognitive closing and political conservativism. Again the NFCS was employed. He found that demand for closing ‘increased with the rightist orientation of the party ‘ ( Kemmelmeier, 1997, p. 2 ) . The correlativities ranged from R = .18.5 to r =.23 as the political parties conservative associations increased ( Kemmelmeier, 1997, p. 2 ) . It is clear from such surveies that need for cognitive closing is an of import forecaster of political conservativism and, therefore, of opposition to alter. Persons with a high demand for cognitive closing appear more likely to keep conservative beliefs. They wish to cut down the menace which ambiguity, capriciousness, or alteration may convey by stop deading on the first piece of information they hear and shuting off their head to any extra information which may change this position ( Kossowska & A ; Van Hiel, 2003 ) .

A 2nd epistemological motivation which has received much empirical support in footings of its relationship to political conservativism is openness to see. Openness to see is one of the variables of the Big Five dimensions. Someone high on openness to see tends to keep flexible beliefs and attitudes about their universe and therefore, is unfastened to alter and new experiences. In contrast, those low on openness to see tend to keep stiff beliefs, and dislike alteration and new experiences, alternatively preferring predictability in their life events ( Costa & A ; McCrae, 1992 ) . A negative correlativity between political conservativism and openness to experience has been supported by empirical grounds. For case, Joe, Jones, and Ryder ( 1977 ) found that people high on conservativism were less likely to take portion in psychological experiments that required openness to see in footings of phantasy ( such as usage of reveries ) , unconventional positions ( such as treatments on star divination or reincarnation ) and other such facets ( Joe, Jones & A ; Ryder, 1977 ) . It is apparent that openness to see is an of import motivation in the development of political conservativism. Political conservativists are likely to defy alteration due to a motive to avoid new experiences. Again, this motivation is likely to originate from a demand to cut down fright and uncertainness brought on by new state of affairss.

Experiential motivations are besides of import in finding whether an person is likely to keep politically conservative political orientations. Experiential motivations refer to the human pursuit to happen significance and value in life ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . They comprise the more affectional determiners of political conservativism. One such motivation is fear of decease. This motivation is best explained by associating it to theories of panic direction. Harmonizing to this theory, fear causes people to show politically conservative behaviors, such as opposition to alter. Worlds are inherently cognizant of their ain mortality and this creates great psychological tenseness and anxiousness. Such panic is more inexplicit than expressed, but however powerful in its effects. To cut down this fright of decease, people deny this contingency by supplying significance and a sense of ego worth to their lives, normally through adhering to a set of societal and cultural beliefs which govern their society ( Landau, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, Pyszczynski, Arndt, Miller, Ogilive & A ; Cook, 2004 ) .

In one survey, participants were primed with ideas of decease or the 9/11 terrorist onslaughts in the U.S. This increased mortality saliency. Attitudes towards so U.S. President George. W. Bush were so measured. As Bush is a conservative politician this survey provides an scrutiny of the relationship between mortality saliency and political conservativism. It was found that increasing mortality saliency led to an addition in support for Bush. This occurs because conservative leaders provide a sense of stableness, diminishing the menace of decease by keeping current societal and cultural value systems ( Landau et al, 2004 ) .

Therefore, it is clear that fright of decease is a powerful experiential motivation in finding an person ‘s likeliness to back up political conservative political orientations and to defy alteration. Indeed, Jost and co-workers found a really strong correlativity ( r = .50 ) between mortality saliency and political conservativism when they analysed a wide scope of surveies similar to that of Landau and co-workers ( Jost EL at, 2003 ) .

A 2nd of import experiential motivation in the development of politically conservative political orientations is fear, choler, and aggression. It is argued that political conservativists are more susceptible and sensitive to fear, and are much more likely than progressives to see the universe as a extremely baleful topographic point. Therefore, conservativists support autocratic type behavior such as penalty of perverts, in order to cut down this fright and menace. ( Jost el al, 2003 ) .

Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, and Taber ( 2002 ) carried out a survey which investigated the relationship between political conservativism and fright, choler, and aggression. They presented participants with either a persuasive message which was either threat-based or reward-based. It was found that those high on dictatorship recognised the threat-based message as more valid and more persuasive than the reward-based message, whereas those low on dictatorship viewed the reward-based message as more valid ( Lavine, Lodge, Polichak & A ; Taber, 2002 ) . As mentioned above, dictatorship is correlated with political conservativism. Therefore, it is clear that political conservativists do look more susceptible to fear. In add-on to a footing in dictatorship, the motivation of fright, choler, and aggression is besides related to the regulative focal point theory discussed supra, where political conservativists appear to utilize a bar focal point system as a agency of self-regulation, therefore concentrating on minimization of menace instead than maximization of wagess.

Ideological motivations besides determine political conservativism. Ideological motivations arise from a demand to cut down uncertainness and menace, supplying people with a sense of intent and certainty. For illustration, the system justification theory discussed before, where persons justify inequality and hegemony, offers a agency of cut downing uncertainness as it justifies the current societal construction and therefore, sees no demand for alteration ( Jost et al, 2003 ) .

Epistemic, experiential, and ideological motivations are all interrelated in that they are all motivated by a demand to cut down fright, uncertainness, and menace. All promote opposition to alter in order to pull off this fright and uncertainness ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . As a consequence, all contribute to the development of political conservativism.

Fear, uncertainness, and menace all play a cardinal function in political conservativism as the demand to cut down all three feelings leads to behavior that embodies the two nucleus elements of political conservativism: opposition to alter and justification of inequality. Each construct will now be discussed in bend.

Many empirical surveies have implicated fright as a taking cause of political conservativism. Decrease of fright is a psychological demand. Certain fears act as motivations that conveying approximately political conservativism. As mentioned above, politically conservative persons may in fact be more sensitive to fear, which makes them more likely to defy alteration ( Lavine et al, 2002 ) . A myriad of different beginnings for fright exist. Besides mentioned supra is the determination that fright of decease leads to politically conservative behaviour such as opposition to alter. This occurs as persons who become progressively cognizant of their ain mortality develop stiff societal and cultural beliefs in order to make a sense of significance and dignity which helps cut down the fright and panic experienced when faced with one ‘s true fate ( Landau et al, 2004 ) .

Another beginning of fright is the chance of loss. Fear and bar of loss lead to resistance to alter. Political conservativists resist any alteration to the societal construction or societal and cultural beliefs as they believe it will ensue in personal loss, be it loss of significance, value, or other factors ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . The function fright plays in the motivation to forestall loss is explained by regulative focal point theory, where politically conservative persons favour the usage of a bar focal point system of self-regulation which emphasizes the minimisation of losingss as opposed to the maximization of wagess and additions ( Higgins, 1997 ) . An person ‘s determination to use either a bar or publicity system is finally determined by their degree of fright. It is clear that fright is by and large related to the experiential motivations involved in political conservativism.

Like fright, menace is besides chiefly linked to experiential motivations involved in political conservativism. Menace has been linked to persons ‘ motivational desire to increase self-esteem. While the relationship between political conservativism and self-esteem requires farther empirical probe, some grounds suggests that persons with low self-prides are more likely to develop politically conservative beliefs ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . For case, Fein and Spencer ( 1997 ) found that low self-pride is positively correlated with an addition in bias. Participants were exposed to a mark individual and the sexual orientation of this individual was manipulated. Besides, some participants received negative feedback from an inexplicit association trial completed antecedently. This was designed to increase menace to one ‘s self-image. Participants who received negative feedback were more likely to pigeonhole the allegedly homosexual mark than participants who did non have this negative feedback ( Fein & A ; Spencer, 1997 ) . Therefore, menace to self-esteem appears to increase bias. Prejudice in bend is linked to justification of inequality which is one of the nucleus elements of political conservativism.

Menace is besides related to a motivation to keep a stable societal system. Under certain fortunes, a menace to the stableness of the societal system frequently leads to the development of political conservativism, peculiarly a opposition to alter. This is most likely to happen in times of crisis, go forthing people insecure and vulnerable ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . Examples of such crisis ‘ may include events such as the 9/11 terrorist onslaughts in the U.S. or the economic crisis during the Wall Street Crash in 1929.

In contrast to fear and menace, uncertainness is chiefly related to the epistemological motivations involved in political conservativism. Wilson ‘s ( 1973 ) theory of uncertainness turning away offers some of import penetrations into the relationship between uncertainness turning away and political conservativism. The chief premise of this theory is that uncertainness poses a greater menace to political conservativists than to more liberalist persons. Political conservativists are therefore more motivated to avoid equivocal state of affairss and fresh experiences. ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . There is much empirical grounds to back up this statement. For case, the personality trait of openness to see is negatively correlated with uncertainness turning away ( Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai & A ; Ostafin, 2007 ) . Furthermore, a survey by Atieh, Brief, and Vollrath ( 1987 ) found that in footings of work, conservativists, topographic point greater value on occupation security than on occupation assortment compared with progressives ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . Therefore, it is apparent that uncertainness turning away is a common motivation for political conservativists.

In an interesting survey, Leone and Chirumbolo ( 2008 ) developed this thought farther by proposing that emotions lead to increased uncertainness, and therefore, political conservativists avoid affect in order to forestall uncertainness. A positive correlativity was so found between political conservativism and emotional turning away. It is thought that this relationship exists as conservativists hold as pessimistic position of worlds in general, and believe social norms and regulations help regulate an basically bad species. Therefore, they distrust powerful emotions, sing them as unpredictable, fickle, and endangering to the stableness of the social system ( Leone & A ; Chirumbolo, 2008 ) .

It is apparent that fright, menace, and uncertainness all make independent parts to the development of political conservativism. However, it should be noted that these constructs are all interdependent and that a comprehensive apprehension of political conservativism requires a comprehension of the ways in which these constructs interact. For case, uncertainness turning away theories inform research on the function of menace to self-pride and besides the function of menace to the construction of the societal system in the development of political conservativism. Besides, fright may originate due to the presence of a peculiar menace ( e.g. inflow of aliens might present a menace to one ‘s occupation by increasing competition for occupations ) . Fear may be linked to uncertainness in that one may fear uncertainness and the unknown ( e.g. one may fear societal alteration because alteration necessarily brings new state of affairss ) . In add-on, fright and uncertainness can be viewed as menaces ( Jost et al, 2003 ) . All of these illustrations emphasise the strong inter-relatedness among all three factors. However, the chief point to underscore is the apparent importance of all three constructs in finding whether an person will be motivated to prosecute in politically conservative behaviors ( uncertainness turning away, opposition to alter, bias, etc ) .

Overall, the motivated social-cognition theory proposed by Jost and co-workers ( 2003 ) is a valuable add-on to the field of psychological science, in peculiar political psychological science, as it offers a comprehensive, integrative history of the multiple psychological foundations and psychological motivations of political conservativism. The personality theories, epistemological and experiential demand theories, and theories of single and corporate rationalisation, which are though to consist the psychological foundations for political conservativism are robust psychological theories in their ain right. Therefore, they provide a strong, obliging model from which to develop a motivated social-cognitive theory of political conservativism.

The two nucleus elements proposed by Jost and co-workers ( 2003 ) are a little more controversial. Some have proposed that both opposition to alter and justification of inequality are more brooding of progressive instead than conservative political orientations ( Greenberg & A ; Jonas, 2003 ) . However, the bulk of research workers in the field of cognitive and political psychological science appear to agree with the positions of Jost and co-workers ( 2003 ) .

The psychological motivations are possibly the most notable facet of Jost and co-workers ‘ ( 2003 ) theory. They win in unifying a battalion of different motivations and inclinations thought to act upon political conservativism which were antecedently merely discussed as mostly unrelated concepts. It is shown how epistemological ( e.g. demand for knowledge, openness to experience ) , experiential ( e.g. fright of decease, menace to self-pride ) , and ideological motivations all play a function in finding whether an person is likely to develop political conservative political orientations. Besides, they include non merely cognitive motivations, but besides societal and cultural influences. Both the situational and contextual determiners of political conservativism are considered.

Finally, it is clear that fright, menace, and uncertainness are critical constructs in understanding the development of political conservativism. Jost and co-workers ( 2003 ) topographic point appropriate importance on these three factors, admiting that they are in a sense the footing of political conservativism. Without the presence of fright, menace, or uncertainness, persons would non develop a motivated desire to cut down all three factors, and therefore, the two nucleus manifestations of political conservativism ( opposition to alter and justification of inequality ) would non be revealed.

There are of class several restrictions to the analysis of political conservativism provided by the motivated social-cognitive theory. Much of the empirical grounds analysed is based on self-report informations. Thus, Jost and co-workers ( 2003 ) analysis has been able to supply grounds for correlativities between assorted motivations and political conservativism but has been limited in doing strong causal illations sing these relationships. A solution for future research would be to increase the focal point on experimental research which could offer more penetration into the contextual fluctuations in the development of political conservativism. This might better the prognostic power of the conditions necessary for the development of political conservativism ( Lavine et al, 2002 ) . Jost and co-workers ( 2003 ) analysis surely does seek to account for contextual factors, but betterments could still be made.

In footings of a societal psychological position, it is of import that one acknowledges the influence of group processes on single attitudes and behaviour. While Jost and co-workers ‘ ( 2003 ) analysis does include some societal motivations ( e.g. societal laterality theory, system justification ) , they focus chiefly on single differences in footings of cognitive motivations.

Social individuality theory is basically a theory of intergroup favoritism. It has been a extremely influential theory in societal psychological science for the last few decennaries. However, societal individuality theory has had small success in the sphere of political psychological science in footings of political individuality ( Huddy, 2001 ) . It is suggested that an analysis of political conservativism that incorporates more elements of societal individuality theory would be good to Jost and co-workers ‘ ( 2003 ) analysis of political conservativism as it could assist explicate why outgroup favoritism may happen, something which is prevailing among conservativists. For illustration, it has been shown that political conservativists are more likely to keep bias attitudes towards certain outgroups and to warrant inequalities between groups. One account for this is single degrees of self-pride, by which persons engage in outgroup disparagement in order to increase their self-esteem ( Fein & A ; Spencer, 1997 ) . Therefore, societal individuality theory could offer of import accounts for this prejudiced facet of political conservativism which the motivated societal cognitive analysis does non turn to.

In footings of cognitive positions, Jost and co-workers ‘ ( 2003 ) analysis was reasonably comprehensive. However, one specific cognitive factor examined separately by many psychologists failed to be included in their analysis of political conservativism: cognitive ability or intelligence. For illustration, Stankov ( 2009 ) found a negative correlativity between political conservativism and cognitive ability ( Stankov, 2009 ) . Therefore, persons with lower educational attainment degrees and lower tonss on mathematical trials and verbal trials have been shown to be progressively likely to keep politically conservative political orientations compared with those of higher cognitive ability.

In amount, Jost and co-workers ‘ ( 2003 ) motivated social-cognitive attack to political conservativism is more true to cognitive positions than societal psychological positions. However, their effort to incorporate both types of positions demonstrates a creativeness and flexibleness which has traditionally been missing in psychological research. A farther integrating of societal positions may take to an even more integrative, utile motivated social-cognitive theory.