Abstract
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This was the most costly and top five deadliest Hurricanes to have happened in the United States History. In August 2005 a huge storm brought down the Eastern Part of New Orleans City and the poorly designed Levees could not stand the weight. The storm of category 5 led to the evacuation and subsequent deaths of a number of residents in the city and the surrounding area. The series of these catastrophes has put the government of United States on the sport light on how prepared they are on responding to disasters of such a magnitude (Mark, 2001, pp.17). Blames have been heaped on the government on the poor planning of the evacuation process and slow government response [late deployment of the Louisiana National Guard]. This essay will look into such related issues and respond on the role that technology played in the whole process. It will also give recommendations on what need to be done after learning from the incident.
Comparing and Contrasting the Two Cases
The two cases led to lose of life but the second one saw a quicker response by the law enforcers and also the residents were fast in heeding the call to evacuate. After what was witnessed in the previous cases, the government was very much aware of the consequences. Since then lot has been put in place and all the levees upgraded just in case a hurricane of the same magnitude or even a higher one strikes. While in the Katrina case, residents were defiant to move out of their homes even just hours before the fall, the scenario was different in Louisiana, people were warned to prepare for a possible evacuation while the storm was still in Caribbean and only 43 deaths occurred as compared to the thousands in the Katrina case (John and Mark, 2002, pp.1-4). This shows the importance of disaster preparedness and the spirit of communal interest and selfless devotion.
The Technology and Plans Put In Place Prior to the Storm
Using what they term their latest technology, the state made a forecast on how the expected storm would be. It was said that the storm would pass through the East of New Orleans with a surge in Lake Pontchartrain going up to 4-5m and waves of 2m. It was also predicted that after the storm, there would be no clean water and oil from refinery companies would spill waste everywhere. Further predictions were that pumping water out of the city would take about six months before the city would be once again accessible (Schleifstein, 2008, pp.4).
The director of National Hurricane Center (NHC), Max Mayfield feared for the worst and called the New Orleans Mayor, Roy Nagin and the then President of U.S George W. Bush to tell them how severe the situation was. Residents began to take precaution in readiness for an evacuation. At first the Mayor called for voluntary evacuation, and then when all seemed not too good, he ordered for a mandatory evacuation. President Bush also made a televised appeal for the residents to heed Nagin’s orders. Many of the residents refused to yield to the pleas and gambled with their own lives…they felt that there was just no way they could abandon their hard earned property and flee, some believed that their homes were safe enough to protect them from the storm. Since the storm had occurred at a time when many residents had not got their pay checks, they could not marshal enough resources to access transportation to ferry their properties, they therefore decided to stay put and hold on to hopes that all will be well (Schleifstein, 2008, pp.5.)…this was not to be. Learning from the previous evacuation during the Hurricane Ivan where many elderly got ill in the process, and cars were held up in traffic for up to ten hours, their hearts just got hardened further and it was very hard for the rescues to convince them to leave.
The NHC covered there watch over the entire coastline of Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama to monitor the storms progress. The government through the U.S Coast Guard positioned their resources in all the expected impact zones and mobilized over 400 Reservists and Air-crews for the rescue mission. The president declared a state of emergency on some regions but left out Louisiana Coastal Parishes [This was quiet debatable]. The Engineer Army Corps gave a prior warning that the storm would lead to massive flooding and thousands may die from it by drowning.
A good number of care giving facilities gave their buses and cars to help in the evacuation process since rental cars and fuel were in short supply. This helped in evacuating about 80% of the 1.3million population in the affected areas. The big Louisiana Superdome played home for many people, housing about 26,000 of them and providing food and water. Several available computer models created to watch the Katrina showed that New Orleans was lying directly in Katrina’s path. And just as had been earlier predicted by the NHC forecast that Katrina would intensify into a Hurricane before landfall, it surely did (Mike, 2006, pp.20).
How Technology was utilized before, during and After the Event
All the concerned parties i.e. the Department of Homeland Security, the federal Emergency management Agency (FEMA) and NHC were briefed long before the landfall on the deadly state of Katrina including the possibility of the levees in New Orleans toppling.
With the help of CSX technology, the path and the landfall point of the storm was predicted and its progress monitored. For anyone who was in doubt, a phone number was made public so that inquiries could be made concerning the same. Before everything was blown out of proportion, the internet became very crucial in locating and communicating with those who were trapped. Technology was therefore vital tool mainly in communication and updating the public on the progress, not to mention appeal for aid of all sorts of nature. Be it cash, blood, or food.
The Decision Makers and how they coordinated with Various Stakeholders
The main drives of the rescue team were drawn from FEMA, NHC and Officers from the department of Defense and Homeland Security. They coordinated their activities via communication over the cell phones and the internet. But with the grave damage of vital communication links and booster stations, coordination of these groups was frustrated. The power failures were also a bigger hitch since only selected stations had back-up generators. All the local Television Stations had their operations disrupted too, and conveying a vital information to the public became an up-hill task, further complicating the situation (Chris, 2005, pp.142-145).
Quality of the Decisions Made by the Government and the Private Sector
FEMA deployed some of their technical staff to the mortuaries with refrigerated trucks to help with the body preservation. The coordination of volunteers, the Coast Guard and the Army Services drawing troops from all the states was outstanding. Further helps by the government to offer evacuees federal help made the situation a little bit bearable. The aids included rent for apartment, fixing ruined homes and providing trailers to help in transportation of property (Mark, 2001, pp.26-39). Many Non-Governmental Organizations were very instrumental in helping the rescue efforts. The Salvation Army, Southern Baptist Convention, Oxfam, American red Cross, Habitat of Humanity, Emergency Communities and Catholic Charities were among the many that boosted the effort, though barred from accessing the New Orleans site immediately by the National Guard citing safety concerns. The groups helped raise well over US$4.25 billion (Mark, 2001, pp.22).
The Amateur Radio Emergency Service was a boost to the effort. After all the communication means had gone down in the area, it was this wing of the Amateur Radio that provided communications in such areas to help relay all the emergency (911) messages. The International Community was not left out either. Several countries gave cash donations to the United States, and notable donors are Cuba and Venezuela who are very hostile to U.S But disaster brought them closer (Madhu, 2005, pp.24-45).
The Short and Long-Term Consequences of the Decisions Made
Even though it seems as if the government tried, some of the decisions made during the crisis can be faulted. There was no central organization that was charged with coordinating the operations. Provided anyone was a member of FEMA, NHC or in any arm of government he/she could be allowed to do what they felt was right…there was complete luck of leadership and coordination among the rescue team. The government did not act fast enough to respond to the catastrophe, and in areas where they did, race and class factors played a role in rescue missions (Bill, 2005, pp.35-38). Due to the above scenarios, the class difference widened, hate of whites by blacks was evident and politically, the Bush’s Administration was loosing.
Conclusion
In case of any tragedy, whether man-made or natural, provided it threatens the security and life of people should be given a quick response. The government needs to mobilize all its state resources to respond to such catastrophes. For instance, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has to ensure that at all the times he has enough personnel and suppliers needed for any emergency response.
The stubbornness of some of the residents cost them their lives…the issues of comparing material wealth with life made some people to stay behind and see for themselves what they could do to save their property. They felt it was their obligation to protect what they called theirs. From this, we get to learn that whatever the uncertainty in us, at all times we should heed to the call of the experts, especially in a case of a disaster prediction.
The Levees failure was a great disappointment to the Civil Engineers U.S Army Corp. It allowed for the flooding of most parts of the city. This is a matter that calls for a big redress on the quality and strength of structures of such nature. The Engineers themselves admitted of a design fault which led to substandard construction (Chris, 2005, pp.175-177). To avoid such an occurrence in the future, flood protection structures have to be of a standard that can hold long enough for any storm surge.
The aftermath of the storm saw an eruption of Civil Disturbance. Looting, Rapes, Snipers and many other criminal activities went off. Most of these criminals targeting rescue police officers, rescue helicopters and other relief workers, these acts jeopardized the state further. It is always advisable to put aside rivalry for a while, attend to a distress call, then recall the remorse later…just like the Cubans and Venezuelans who set aside their differences with the U.S agreed to give the U.S donations. Collective responsibility is good for the benefit of all in a society.
The decision by the government to act quickly to set up camps and shelters to host the evacuees helped a great deal, it saw many lives being saved and, by the use of Buses and in some cases Choppers in areas with damaged infrastructure it showed how committed the team was. Individuals who refused to be evacuated were forced out of their homes by the National Guards as ordered by the Mayor who cited health and safety for them as well as to bring law and order to the city…it is quiet a surprise to note that the mayor seemed more concerned about their welfare more than themselves.
References
Beriwal Madhu. (2005). “Hurricanes Pam and Katrina: A Lesson in Disaster Planning.” Natural Hazards Observer. Pp.24-45.
Ibid (2005)…”Hurricane Pam and Hurricane Katrina: Pre-event ‘Lessons Learned’.” EIIP Virtual Forum Presentation. pp. 76-112.
Fischetti Mark. (2001). “Drowning New Orleans.” Scientific American. Pp.17-39.
Mark Schleifstein (2008). “Louisiana gears up for Gustav as it makes landfall in Haiti”. The Times-Picayune. Pp.4-5.
McQuaid John and Schleifstein Mark. (2002).”Washing Away.” Times Picayune. Pp.1-4.
Mooney Chris. (2005).”Thinking Big About Hurricanes.” The American Prospect. Pp.141-177.
Schoenbrod David. (2005). “The Lawsuit That Sank New Orleans”: Wall Street Journal. pp.17.
Tidwell Mike (2006). ”The Ravaging Tide: Strange Weather, Future Katrinas, and the Coming Death of America’s Coastal Cities. Free Press. Pp.11-23.
Walsh Bill, Alpert Bruce and McQuaid John. (2005). “Feds’ Disaster Planning Shifts Away from Preparedness.” New house News Service. Pp.35-38.
