Explain the circumstances in which rights and

Explain the fortunes in which rights and duties arise or continue after the employment relationship has ended. Explain the historical development of the countries that you choose to discourse.

Introduction

It is clear that whilst most employment rights and duties arise and apply in relation to the relationship which exists between employer and employee during the period in which the employment contract exists. However, this is by no agency ever the instance, there are state of affairss in which both employers and employees will hold legal duties towards each other after this relationship has ended. It will non be possible to cover all these state of affairss in the undermentioned work, but this essay will dwell in an effort to pull attending foremost to the go oning duties which are of import to the employer, viz. the duty on the employee non to unwrap confidential information gained in the class of their employment. Second it will analyze the duties and rights which are of import to employees. The first of these is with respect to mentions from the former employer the proviso of which may give rise to a claim in civil wrong for the former employee, depending on the fortunes. The 2nd and reasonably recent development in relation to employees relates to the anti favoritism statute law. The protection under this statute law now extends to protect employees after the employment contract has ended in certain fortunes. Third the essay will look at some of the procedural rights and duties which arise after the employment contract has ended. In this subdivision I will concentrate on the modified statutory disciplinary and dismissal process and statutory grudge process which come into drama after the employment contract has ended and the duty on the portion of the employer to give grounds for a dismissal after the effectual day of the month of expiration.

Competition by Ex-employees

In certain fortunes employers can keep the activities of their employees even after the employment contract has ended. The employers will be entitled to protect their legitimate trade involvements in two ways. First they may trust on the responsibility of trueness and fidelity which implies into the employment contract a term of confidentiality which extends to ex-employees. Secondly employers may include a restrictive compact in the employment contract which restrains the employee from transporting out certain activities.

Covering chiefly with the responsibility of trueness and fidelity, it seems clear from the instance jurisprudence that the responsibility will merely be invoked if the breach takes topographic point before the employment ceased. [ 1 ] Second the tribunals are more likely to keep the usage of touchable information than intangible information. So for illustration in the instance ofRobb V Green[ 2 ] the ex employee was restrained from utilizing a list of his employer’s clients which he had copied before go forthing his employment for his ain advantage. If the information which the employee is utilizing is non written the tribunals will be loath to keep the employee. [ 3 ]

A differentiation will besides be drawn between the employees general cognition and single accomplishment of the employee which he may hold gained in the class of his employment and something which out to be regarded as a trade secret and deserving of protection by the employer. [ 4 ] The instance ofFacenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [ 1986 ] ICR 297upheld the being of an implied responsibility in relation to utilize and revelation of information, but restricted it to merchandise secrets and specifically distinguished information which had become portion of the employees own accomplishment and cognition. The Court of Appeal in this instance besides drew attending to the inquiry of whether the employer expressed the confidentiality to the employee. This was relevant though non deciding. In the instant instance information associating to gross revenues which the employee attempted to utilize after his employment with them ended, was held non to be a trade secret on the face of it and the employers had non done plenty to show its confidentiality.

The information in inquiry need non be complicated and proficient, but it must decently be regarded as confidential. In the instance ofThomas Marshall ( Exports ) Ltd V Guinle[ 5 ] Megarry VC laid out four elements to the trial for confidentiality which are as follows:

1. The proprietor of the information must believe that its information the release of which would be deleterious to the employer or advantage his challengers.
2. The proprietor must believe the information is confidential and non in the public sphere.
3. The above beliefs must be sensible.
4. The information will be judged in the visible radiation of the peculiar industry and trade patterns.

One extra point to observe in relation to the implied responsibility of trueness and fidelity is that it has been held that in certain fortunes the public involvement will necessitate that the information in inquiry is disclosed to those who have a proper involvement in having it. [ 6 ] For illustration where the information relates to misbehave on the portion of the employer, the employee will non be restrained from informing the relevant regulative organic structure.

In footings of redress, the most appropriate redress for the employer will be an injunction to forestall the employee utilizing confidential information and amendss for breaches of the implied responsibility which the employee has already committed.

The 2nd manner in which an duty might originate on the portion of the employee to act in a peculiar manner after employment has ended is if their employment contract contains an express restrictive compact. The fact that the implied responsibility discussed above is comparatively limited in scope means many employers frequently prefer to utilize this signifier of contractual term. However, to be enforceable the term must protect a legitimate concern involvement. It is non possible to expressly forbid competition.

Because the clauses seek to curtail the manner in which the ex employee does concern after his employment has ended, the philosophy of restraint of trade will besides use. Therefore the term will be leading facie nothingness and merely enforceable if it’s sensible. It has been held that in this respect it must be sensible in mention to the involvements of the parties concerned or the public “so framed, so guarded as to afford equal protection to the party in whose favor they are imposed, while at the same time…in no manner deleterious to the public.” [ 7 ] The load is on the employer to set up rationality and must be no more than moderately necessary to afford the protection sought. The rationality must be judged at the clip the contract was made. [ 8 ] It will besides be judged on a instance to instance footing with the peculiar trade or concern in head. The length of the restraint and the geographical country which it covers are things which will be taken into consideration.

There must besides be a legitimate proprietary involvement in the topic of the term. As with the implied term of trueness and fidelity, the employer can non curtail the employee from viing utilizing the cognition and accomplishment with which the employment has equipped him, merely personal cognition of trade secrets or connexions, employees or providers which were acquired from his employers and which may disfavor them. [ 9 ]

The tribunals attack to construing these clauses has non ever been consistent. For illustration in the instance ofLittlewoods Organisation Ltd V Harris[ 10 ] Lord Denning took a broad ranging clause which prevented the ex employee working for any rival companies or subordinates throughout the universe and implied into it restricting words so as to curtail it to the portion of the concern which the employer was moderately allowed to protect. However inJA Mont UK Ltd V Mills[ 11 ] the Court of Appeal struck down a clause that prevented the ex employee working for a specific challenger for one twelvemonth. Their logical thinking was that there was

“no effort to explicate the compact so as to concentrate on restraint necessary to guard against possible abuse of the information, the lone legitimate mark for enforcing any restraint on future employment.”[ 12 ]

Employers would be good advised to follow a restrictive attack to these compacts as it is non ever clear how generous the tribunals will be in construing clauses which impose duties on the employee after their employment has ended.

It does now seem clear that if the terminal of the employee’s contract has come about because of a breach on the portion of the employer, such as unlawful expiration the employer will non be able to implement a restrictive compact restricting the activities of the employee. This was the attack in the early instance ofGeneral Billposting Ltd V Attkinson[ 13 ] . There was some difference amongst the tribunals as to the consequence of a clause which restricted station expiration activities howsoever the expiration came approximately, for illustration “whether lawful or unlawful” . For a clip the tribunals focused on the specific building of the clause and hence in the instance of a clause such as this the employer would be able to implement it irrespective of a unlawful expiration. However the instance ofRock Refrigeration Ltd V Jones and Seward Refrigeration Ltd[ 14 ] eventually settled the affair in favor of the former attack. There are two chief justifications for this. First, the premature and unlawful expiration of the contract deprived the employee of full consideration in exchange for which he accepted the station expiration restraint. Second, the unlawful renunciation, as unlawful expiration would be, puts an terminal to the full contract and hence releases the employee from any of his duties under it.

It may be that the tribunals elect to break up the clause so as to take the offending parts of it and go forthing the remainder in tact. This will merely be done if the portion they are seeking to break up is independent from the remainder of the clause and the remainder of the clause makes sense without it. The tribunals will non compose a new a new compact or change the nature of the understanding. [ 15 ]

It is clear so that the tribunals are prepare to accept that certain contractual duties, both implied and expressed, continue or arise after the contract has come to an terminal. They are likely to take a reasonably restrictive attack to how far the antique employee can be restrained in his future employment or trade and they will merely let their activities to be restricted to the extent perfectly necessary to protect their former employer’s involvement.

Mentions

The proviso of a mention by an employer will evidently take topographic point after the employment contract has come to an terminal. Whilst the employer is under no duty to supply a mention, if he does take to make so there is an duty that it be accurate. If they do non they may go apt in civil wrong to both the subsequent employer who relies on the mention and the topic of the mention. [ 16 ]

There are three possible causes of action for the employee. Defamation and malicious falsity are comparatively noncontroversial, but it now seems that the employee may hold a cause of action in negligent misstatement. This relates back to theHedley Byrne and Co v Heller[ 17 ] opinion that recovery can be made for pure economic loss where a particular relationship exists between the parties.

With respect to defamation the mention is protected by qualified privilege, since the employer and possible employer have an involvement in it. [ 18 ] However this defense mechanism is lost if it can be shown that the individual giving the mention is motivated by maliciousness. The suspect must hold an honest, positive belief in the truth of what he publishes. If he publishes recklessly will be treated as if he knew it was false. [ 19 ] The employee will non be able to avail himself of this cause of action if he implicitly consented to the publication. In the instance ofFriend v Civil Aviation Authority[ 20 ] the employee accepted a disciplinary codification as portion of his employment contract. It was held that he thereby explicitly consented to the republication of a peculiar ailment as portion of a disciplinary procedure and he could non therefore complain about its republication in a mention.

The 2nd cause of action for the employee would be deleterious or malicious falsity. In this instance the employee must demo that the employer made the statements maliciously, meaning them to do him damage. [ 21 ] It needn’t sum to an onslaught on the claimant’s character as with calumny.

The tribunals did look to be traveling in the way of accepting that the referee owed a responsibility of attention in carelessness to the employee as the topic of the mention. In the instance ofLawton V BOC Transfield Ltd[ 22 ] Tudor J held that the employee relied on the referee to give an accurate mention and there was sufficient propinquity and foreseeability for a responsibility of attention to originate. The responsibility was to take sensible attention to guarantee that the sentiments stated are based on accurate facts. The House of Lords eventually confirmed this responsibility of attention in the instance ofSpring V Guardian Assurances[ 23 ] . They held that the Hedley Byrne demands were present. Furthermore, they held that the balance of public involvement favoured that a redress in carelessness be available.

Whilst the mention is required to be accurate it is non necessary, to get away liability, that it be to the full comprehensive. The responsibility is to take sensible attention non to give deceptive information whether as a consequence of below the belt selective proviso of information or by the inclusion of facts and sentiments in such a mode as to give rise to a misguided illation in the head of a sensible receiver. [ 24 ]

If the employer mentions a ailment which has non been brought to the employee’s attending the employer may be in breach of the implied term of trust and assurance. As a consequence of this the employee may be able to claim to hold been constructively dismissed. [ 25 ] The employer is now besides under a responsibility non to know apart against the former employer on the footing of sex, race or disablement. This will be discussed at length in the undermentioned subdivision.

In drumhead when the employment relationship comes to an terminal and an employer agrees to supply a mention for the former employee a duty arises to supply and accurate history of the employee. The employee has the option of several causes of action in civil wrong if the employer does non follow with this duty.

Post- Employment Discrimination

The right on the portion of the employee non to be discriminated against has late been held to outlast the employment contract. This right stems form the anti favoritism statute law, The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 ( SDA ) , The Race Relations Act 1976 ( RRA ) and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 ( DDA ) . The relevant instance wasRelaxion Group plc ( Respondents ) v Rhys-Harper ( FC ) ( Appellant ) , D’Souza ( Appellant ) v London Borough of Lambeth ( Respondents ) , Jones ( Appellant ) v 3M Healthcare Limited ( Respondents ) and three other actions( The Relaxion instance ) . These dealt with the inquiry in each of the three Acts consecutively. In order to understand the determination in the Relaxion instance it is necessary to look at the relevant statute law and the history taking up to that determination.

The relevant subdivisions of the anti favoritism statute law are as follows:

1. Section 6 ( 2 ) of the SDA 1975
2. Section 4 ( 2 ) of the RRA 1976
3. Section 4 ( 2 ) of the DDA 1995

With respect to the SDA and the RRA the employer is prohibited from know aparting against a individual “employed by him” . The DDA prohibits favoritism against person “whom he employs” . The inquiry is whether these phrases can be interpreted to widen to actions taken by the employer after the contract of employment has ended, i.e. after the effectual day of the month of expiration.

The instance ofAdekeye v Post Office[ 26 ] the Court of Appeal held that the RRA did non use to favoritism which occurred after the employment contract had ended, so an employee who suffered race favoritism during an entreaty against dismissal was non protected by the statute law. The place in relation to arouse favoritism was thought to be the same. However the European Court of Justice held in the instance ofCoote V Granada Hospitality[ 27 ] that the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 EEC did use to a state of affairs where the employer refused to give the employee a mention because he was know aparting against her on the evidences of sex.

When theRhys Harper V Relaxioninstance came to the Court of Appeal the tribunal surprisingly confined Coote to its facts and held that the employer’s refusal to look into a sexual torment claim did non conflict the SDA because it occurred after the employment had ended. The Court of Appeal besides refused to revisit the Adekeye determination in the visible radiation of Coote when the D’Souza instance came before them. The two instances along with a figure of disablement favoritism instances headed by that ofJones v 3M Health Carewent up to the House of Lords and were heard consecutively.

The instance hinged on the reading of the three subdivisions notes above. The House held that there was no discernible difference between the three. Lord Hobhouse stated:

“These legislative acts should be read as lending to a developing strategy of anti favoritism jurisprudence and as such the words should non without good ground be given different reading as between one of the legislative acts and another. They are non legislative acts to be officially read with each other, but they are legislative acts which reflect a consistent ( though developing ) legislative policy.”

The House held that the statute law could be interpreted to widen past the effectual day of the month of expiration so long as a sufficient connexion could be proved between the post-employment favoritism and the employment. The indispensable logical thinking was that the favoritism statute law applies to the full employment relationship which can go on after the effectual day of the month of expiration of the employment contract. The House of Lords could see non ground to randomly stop the protection of the employee on the effectual day of the month of expiration if they were still holding traffics with the employer stemming from their former employment.

It should be noted that the D’Souza instance was still dismissed because it concerned a refusal to re-instate the employee allegedly on prejudiced evidences. The House of Lords held that because re-instatement was a statutory redress provided for unjust dismissal it did non fall within the range of the RRA.

Coincidentally, the anti favoritism statute law has undergone a recent inspection and repair in response to the EC Directive on Race Discrimination and Framework Employment. The SDA and RRA Amended Regulation 2003 now explicitly province that favoritism continues to be improper after the employment relationship has ended ‘where the favoritism arises out of and is closely connected to that relationship’ Similar commissariats were incorporated in the amended DDA which came into force in October 2004. It is deserving observing that the RRA ordinances merely apply to favoritism on the evidences of race or cultural or national beginning ( non color or nationality ) which might intend that D’Souza continues to use more widely. The restriction in relation to re instatement is besides likely to last.

To reason this subdivision it is now a clearly established rule, whether by instance jurisprudence or statute law implementing EC directives that the employees right non to be discriminated against continues after the official terminal of the employment contract. This is clearly a logical place for the jurisprudence to be in. There can be no sense in taking the protection from the employee on the precise effectual day of the month of expiration when certain parts of the employment relationship continue past this day of the month, for illustration the may wish to appeal against a dismissal or be provided with a mention. If they are non protected from favoritism during these proceedings they may good be loath to take portion in them at some considerable disadvantage to themselves. This would non be a satisfactory province of personal businesss for any anti favoritism undertaking. Some of these post employment procedural affairs will be discussed in more item in the undermentioned subdivision.

Procedural rights and duties which arise and continue post-employment

1. Written Statement of Reasons for Dismissal

An employee is entitled to be provided with a written statement of grounds for his dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996 s 92 ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) as amended by the Employment Rights ( Dispute Resolution ) Act 1998. The written statement may mention to paperss already given to the employee, but transcripts these paperss must be provided. [ 28 ] The employee must bespeak the statement with 14 yearss of the effectual day of the month of expiration. The employer is non required to supply a written statement of grounds if one is non requested save in two specific fortunes. The first is that the employee was pregnant at the clip of dismissal or on pregnancy leave. The 2nd is that they had taken clip off work because they have late adopted. In those fortunes the employer must supply a written statement of grounds to the employee whether they request one or non. Normally the employee must hold been continuously employed for a twelvemonth to take advantage of this subdivision, but once more this does non use to the two classs mentioned above.

The punishments for failure are contained in Section 93 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 as amended. If an employer unreasonably fails to supply a statement on petition the Employment Tribunal will do a declaration as to what it finds the employers grounds for dismissal to hold been. If the employer purports to give grounds, but they are unequal or untrue he will be taken to hold failed to supply grounds. They must besides order the employer to pay the equivalent of two hebdomads pay to the employee. Two points can be noted about this subdivision. First, it used to be that the employee had to unreasonably ‘refuse’ to supply a written statement. The word ‘fails’ was introduced in the Trade Union Reform and Employment Act 1993. It clearly provided a wider right to the employee to do usage of subdivision 93 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Second, subdivision 93 is penal in nature and as such the Employment Appeals Tribunal has hence held that it must be stiffly construed. The failure must be unreasonable. [ 29 ] Several rules have been developed around this demand. It will non be considered unreasonable, for illustration, if the employer candidly believes that there has been no dismissal. [ 30 ] It will besides non be unreasonable if the ground the employer gives is candidly what he believes to be the ground for dismissal. The court will non see whether it is a good or a bad ground. [ 31 ] The papers provided must be worded in such a manner that the employee and anyone else who he chooses to demo it to would be able to cognize from reading it why he was dismissed. [ 32 ]

The employment court can non hear instances which arise from statements which the employer has voluntarily provided. In instances arisen out of written statements which have been requested the written statement will be admissible as grounds of the grounds for dismissal in any proceedings. [ 33 ] If the employer gives another ground in subsequent judicial proceeding the tribunal can either disregard it and keep the employer to his original statement or handle the statement as traveling to the employer’s credibleness.

This in one illustration of a procedural right which arises after the employment contact has ended. Obviously this could non originate before such a clip as it relate specifically to dismissal and arises after the effectual day of the month of expiration.

The Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures.

It is common cognition that in the event of a contemplated dismissal the employer is under an duty to transport out a statutory three phase dismissal and disciplinary process ( DDP ) . The three phases are a statement puting out the employee’s alleged behavior, a meeting to discourse the affair and a right to appeal any subsequent determination. However this process may non be possible if the employment has already come to an terminal. A modified disciplinary process will use in the undermentioned fortunes:

1. The employer dismissed the employee by ground of his or her behavior without notice.
2. The dismissal took topographic point at the clip when the employer became cognizant of the behavior or instantly afterwards.
3. The employer was entitled in the fortunes to disregard the employee without notice. [ 34 ]

The Department of Trade and Industry Guidance suggests that this will merely be the instance in a really limited figure of fortunes. It is about ever unjust to summarily disregard an employee without probe, even in the face of evident gross misconduct. The modified process will besides non use where the employee presents their ailment of unjust dismissal before the employer has sent a written statement of evidences for dismissal. [ 35 ] The duty to supply a written statement of evidences for dismissal arises under paragraph 4 of the modified process contained in agenda 2 of the Act.

The Disciplinary process will non use in the undermentioned fortunes:

1. One party has sensible evidences for believing that get downing or finishing the process would ensue in a important menace to the party or their belongings or another party or their belongings.
2. The party has been the topic of torment, defined by ordinance 11 ( 4 ) , and has sensible evidences for believing that get downing the DDP would farther the torment.
3. It is non moderately operable to get down to DDP within a sensible period.

These exclusions apply every bit to the criterion DDP, but one might conceive of them to be more likely to originate if the employee no longer works for the employer by ground of drumhead dismissal.

Similarly there is a modified grudge process which comes into drama after the employee has ceased to be employed. [ 36 ] Efficaciously the modified process removes the demand for a meeting and allows the party to carry on the process by missive. Extra conditions for its application are

1. Either the employer was unaware of the grudge at the clip of expiration or they were cognizant of it but the standard grudge process had non been complete before the expiration. AND
2. The parties agree in composing to utilize the modified process. [ 37 ] In regard of this demand the understanding must associate to a specific grudge, it can non be a cover understanding to cover with all station employment grudges via the modified process.

The same exclusions as with the DDP apply and neither the standard nor modified process where it is no longer operable for the ex-employee to compose a missive

These modified processs provide utile illustrations of the manner in which some of the procedural demands of employment jurisprudence apply after the employment contract has ended.

Decision

I would reason by stating first that the affairs discussed above are by no agencies exhaustive of the ways rights and duties arise and continue after the employment contract has come to an terminal. What I hope to hold done is supply some recent and some more historical illustrations to exemplify the fact that in a assortment of fortunes the employment relationship does non come to an terminal at the effectual day of the month of expiration. This is so from both the employer and employees point of position. We have seen that the employee’s duty to keep confidentiality extends past the terminal of the contract for such a clip and in such a manner as is sensible to protect the involvements of the employer. The employer on the other manus is under a responsibility to supply an accurate mention after the employment has ended and continues to be prohibited from know aparting against the former employee during proceedings which arise from the employment, but which take topographic point after the effectual day of the month of expiration. Furthermore there are procedural issues which arise after the effectual day of the month of expiration and these have been specifically provided in the employment statute law. Employers and employees likewise would make good to retrieve that their relationship does non come to an immediate arrest at the effectual day of the month of expiration. The relationship implies several rights and duties which continue good after that day of the month.

Bibliography

Cases

• Robb V Green [ 1895 ] 2 QB 315
• Facenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [ 1986 ] ICR 297
• Hart V Colley ( 1890 ) 59 LJ Ch 355
• Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [ 1964 ] 3 All ER 731
• Thomas Marshall ( Exports ) Ltd V Guinle[ 1978 ] ICR 905
• Gartide V Outman ( 1856 ) 3 Jun NS 39
• Littlewoods Organisation Ltd V Harris[ 1977 ] 1 WLR 1472
• Nordenfelt V Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Amunition Co [ 1894 ] AC 535
• Home Counties Dairies v Skilton [ 1970 ] IWLR 526
• Spafax Ltd v Harrison [ 1980 ] IRLR 442
• JA Mont UK Ltd V Mills[ 1993 ] IRLR 172
• General Billposting Ltd V Attkinson[ 1909 ] AC 188
• Rock Refrigeration Ltd V Jones and Seward Refrigeration Ltd[ 1996 ] IRLR 675
• Mason v Provident Clothing Co Ltd [ 1913 ] AC 724
• Spring V Guardian Assurance [ 1994 ] ICR 596
• Hedley Byrne and Co v Heller[ 1964 ] AC 465
• Jackson v Happerton ( 1864 ) 16 CB ( NS ) 829
• Horrocks V Lowe [ 1975 ] AC 135
• Friend v Civil Aviation Authority[ 1998 ] IRLR
• Ratcliffe V Evans [ 1892 ] 2 QB 524
• Lawton V BOC Transfield Ltd[ 1987 ] ICR 7
• Kidd V Axa Equity and Law Life Assurance Association plc [ 2000 ] IRLR 301
• TSB Bank Ltd v Harris [ 2000 ] IRLR 157
• Relaxion Group plc ( Respondents ) v Rhys-Harper ( FC ) ( Appellant ) , D’Souza ( Appellant ) v London Borough of Lambeth ( Respondents ) , Jones ( Appellant ) v 3M Healthcare Limited ( Respondents ) and three other actions
• Adekeye v Post Office [ 1997 ] IRLR 105 CA
• Coote V Granada Hospitality [ 1999 ] IRLR 452
• Gilham V Kent County Council [ 1985 ] ICR 227
• Charles Long and Sons Ltd V Aubry [ 1978 ] ICR 168
• Brown v Stuart Scott and Co [ 1981 ] ICR 166
• Harvard Scientists Ltd V Younghusband [ 1990 ] IRLR 17
• Horsley Smith and Sherry ltd 5 Dutton [ 1977 ] IRLR 172

Legislation

• The Sex Discrimination Act 1975
• The Race Relations Act 1976
• Disability Discrimination Act 1995
• Race Relations Act 1976 ( Amendment ) Regulations 2003
• Sex Discrimination Act 1975 ( Amendment ) Regulations 2003
• Disability Discrimination Act 1995 ( Amendment ) Regulations 2004
• Employment Rights Act 1996
• Employment Rights ( Dispute Resolution ) Act 1998
• Trade Union Reform and Employment Act 1993
• Employment Act 2002 ( Dispute Resolution ) Regulations 2004

Other

• The Law of Termination of the Contract. Robert Upex 7^ThursdayEdition Jordan Publishing ltd 2006
• Halsbury’s Laws of England. Employment ( Volume 16 ( 1 ) ( B ) ) Reissue
• Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law
• Bulletin of the Commission’s Network of Legal Experts on the Application of Community Law on Equal Treatment. European Commission CE –V/2-03-003-EN-C