Controlling Case study Essay

Abstract This paper surveies direction control design of supplier relationships in fabrication. a supply concatenation stage presently under-explored. Compared to supplier dealingss during procurance and R & A ; D. which research found to be governed by a combination of formal and informal controls. provider dealingss in fabrication are more formal. so that they could be governed by more formal and less informal controls. To polish the direction control system and act uponing eventualities. we propose a theoretical model specifically adapted for the fabrication phase.

This model is investigated by an in deepness instance survey of the provider direction control of a Volvo Cars production installation. We identify three types of providers visualising the associations in the model and exemplifying the framework’s explicative power in ( automotive ) fabrication. Furthermore. the instance contradicts that provider dealingss in the fabrication stage are governed by small informal control. because the car manufacturer extremely values the function of trust edifice and societal force per unit area.

Most notably. a structured provider squad maps as a kin and establishes informal control among take parting providers. which strengthens the automaker’s control on dyadic provider dealingss. Keywords: Management control ; Supplier relationships ; Manufacturing ; Contingency theory ; Case research ; Automotive 2 1. Introduction In the current economic environment. characterised by globalization and enhanced degrees of competition. companies require an effectual supply concatenation with inter-organizational relationships ( IORs ) to endeavor for sustainable competitory advantage.

Not surprisingly. surveies show that IORs have a high possible impact on organisation public presentation ( e. g. Anderson & A ; Dekker. 2005 ) . Literature. nevertheless. besides argues that many IORs do non supply the expected benefits and are frequently terminated because of pull offing troubles ( Ireland. Hitt & A ; Vaidynanath. 2002 ) . Academicians frequently propose that deficiency of coordination and timeserving behavior of spouses are the two chief grounds for the comparatively high relationship failure rate ( e. g. Dekker. 2004 ) .

Hence. direction control systems ( MCSs ) are argued to play a critical function in forestalling such failure. by set uping administration mechanisms to command the relationship ( Ireland et al. . 2002 ) . The cardinal end of MCSs is to act upon determination devising in achieving strategic aims ( Nixon & A ; Burns. 2005 ) . In an inter-organizational scene. this implies making bilateral inducements to prosecute common ends. Already in the ninetiess. bookmans started naming for more attending for this subject ( e. g. Hopwood. 1996 ; Otley. 1994 ) . and have non stopped since ( e. g. new wave der Meer-Kooistra & A ; Vosselman. 2006 ) .

Consequently. inter-organisational MCSs have been studied from several angles. including outsourcing ( e. g. Anderson. Glenn & A ; Sedatole. 2000 ) . inter-organizational cost direction ( e. g. Cooper & A ; Slagmulder. 2004 ) . partnerships ( e. g. Seal. Berry. Cullen. Dunlop & A ; Ahmed. 1999 ) . strategic confederations ( e. g. Dekker 2004 ) . webs ( e. g. Kajuter & A ; Kulmala. 2005 ) and joint ventures ( e. g. Kamminga & A ; van der MeerKooistra. 2007 ) .

Yet. the chief accent was put on relational coaction during the first phases of the supply concatenation. viz. procurance. which involves the make-or-buy determination. spouse choice and contract design. and R & A ; D. Although this historical focal point is surely justified. direction control in a ulterior stage of the supply concatenation. viz. fabricating. remains comparatively under-explored ( Cooper & A ; Slagmulder. 2004 ; Langfield-Smith & A ; Smith. 2003 ) .

However. purchased merchandises and services for fabricating history for more than 60 % of the mean company’s sum costs ( Degraeve & A ; Roodhooft. 2001 ) and are capable to uninterrupted betterment with providers. besides necessitating equal direction control. Therefore. this survey illustrates how makers design the MCS of provider dealingss in the fabrication stage of the supply concatenation. which we refer to as “manufacturer-supplier relationships” ( MSRs ) .

In other words. we abstract from 3 procurance and R & A ; D influences. 1 Nevertheless. direction control research on old supply concatenation phases. offers a first theoretical penetration into how a MCS for MSRs could look like. In peculiar. anterior empirical research on IORs such as R & A ; D coaction ( Cooper & A ; Slagmulder. 2004 ) . strategic confederations ( Dekker 2004 ) and joint ventures ( Kamminga & A ; van der Meer-Kooistra. 2007 ) found MCSs that combine both formal controls. like result controls. and more informal controls. such as trust edifice.

Besides the executing of service outsourcing undertakings. like industrial care ( van der Meer-Kooistra & A ; Vosselman. 2000 ) . IT ( Langfield-Smith & A ; Smith. 2003 ) and accounting ( Nicholson. Jones & A ; Espenlaub. 2006 ) is governed by a combined MCS. So if we assume these findings to keep for other IOR types ( external cogency ) and neglect possible characteristic differences. MSRs could be expected to be governed by a combination of formal and informal control every bit good. Yet. by taking into history differences between MSRs and other types of IORs. the MCS design could be different.

In that regard. we argue that fabrication is more formal than procurance and R & A ; D. Indications for that statement and its effects for direction control can be found in the direction control model of Das & A ; Teng ( 2001 ) . Based on the variables in their framework2. undertaking programmability and outcome quantifiability. it should be clear that for fabricating both variable degrees are high. or at least higher than in the instance of procurance and R & A ; D. Consequently. the model indicates that formal controls are suited mechanisms to regulate MSRs.

This statement is strengthened by the type of cognition use in MSRs. for which organisation literature provides a clear differentiation between cognition geographic expedition and cognition development. On the one manus. it is argued that the first supply concatenation stages. think of procurance and R & A ; D. purpose at cognition geographic expedition. while the ulterior phases. like fabrication. chiefly 1 Obviously. procurance and R & A ; D do impact the fabrication stage.

Yet. as our purpose is polishing supplier MCS design in the fabrication stage. we intentionally exclude these influences. In footings of research methodological analysis. this abstraction is put into operation by analyzing a MSR between a maker installation and provider installation merely covering with fabrication. while procurance and R & A ; D are handled by their several female parent companies ( cf portion three of this paper “research methodology” ) . 2 Although this model was originally developed by Ouchi ( 1979 ) for usage in MCS design within organisations. Das & A ; Teng ( 2001 ) further adapted it for usage in IORs.

Task programmability refers to the grade to which directors understand the transmutation procedure in which appropriate behavior is to take topographic point. Outcome quantifiability refers to the ability to mensurate result exactly and objectively. When outcome quantifiability is high/low and task programmability is low/high. formal outcome/behaviour control should be set up to regulate the relation. When both dimensions are low. informal control is preferred. but when both steps are high. both result and behaviour control are suited control mechanisms ( Das & A ; Teng. 2001 ) .

4 purpose at cognition development. On the other manus. research shows that the geographic expedition of cognition is best governed by informal controls. while cognition development is most adequately controlled by formal controls ( Bijlsma-Frankema & A ; Costa. 2005 ) . Thus. based on the features of high undertaking programmability. high result quantifiability and cognition development ends. MSRs could be expected to be governed by chiefly formal controls with small informal controls. In other words. the literature offers different direction control designs for MSRs sing the informal control degree.

Therefore. this survey investigates how the MCS of MSRs is designed and how of import informal controls are in that design. in peculiar in IORs between an original equipment maker ( OEM ) and providers of outsourced fabrication activities in the trendsetting automotive industry ( cf Womack. Jones & A ; Roos. 1990 ) . An car is a complex merchandise manufactured with 1000s of constituents. Consequently. besides this industry progressively outsourced non-core activities and started trusting on providers to make lower costs.

To that terminal. a assortment of supply concatenation direction patterns has been implemented. such as thin supply and uninterrupted betterment. Yet. these induce the demand for appropriate direction control structures and bi-directional communicating to form and pull off the relation ( Carr & A ; Ng. 1995 ; Scannell. Vickery & A ; Droge. 2000 ) . In that regard. one peculiar car manufacturer. viz. Toyota. is known for partnering with providers. reassigning its expertness to assist providers and put ining softer signifiers of control including trust.

To regulate the hunt for uninterrupted betterment in fabrication. Toyota established the “Toyota Group” by agencies of a provider association. an operations direction consulting division and voluntary little group larning squads ( Dyer & A ; Nobeoka. 2000 ) . However. practician literature ( e. g. Automotive News/Automotive News Europe ) describes several other car manufacturers regulating this hunt by to a great extent formalized provider dealingss. Contrary to cooperation during procurance and R & A ; D. fabrication is argued to go much more demanding towards providers.

Car manufacturers progressively transfer fabricating hazard and supply duty to first-tier providers. which consequences in providers presenting to really tight just-in-time and in-sequence agendas ( Alford. Sackett & A ; Nelder. 2000 ) . As a consequence. OEMs install formal controls and provider betterment techniques. which alert providers to the importance of bettering supply public presentation at lower costs. Hence. besides automotive pattern shows grounds of high and low degrees of informal control. Therefore. this survey specifically investigates how the MCS of automotive MSRs is designed.

Yet. besides exemplifying MCS design. this paper contributes to explicating MCS design of automotive 5 MSRs. To our cognition. small inter-organizational direction control research specifically investigated eventuality theory’s explicative power in fabrication. Naturally. several documents study influences on MCS design in production environments. like the impact of fabricating flexibleness ( Abernethy & A ; Lillis. 1995 ) . customization and related mutuality ( Bouwens & A ; Abernethy. 2000 ) . net income Centre scheme ( Lillis. 2002 ) . production scheme. production engineering and organisation ( van Veen-Dirks. 2006 ) .

However. these surveies investigate features explicating MCS design in one administration. while our survey focuses on inter-organizational dealingss. To that terminal. we propose a refined theoretical eventuality model based on recent inter-organizational direction control theory. but specifically adapted for the fabrication phase. This model proposes several eventualities finding the degree of hazard. which is governed by different degrees of direction control techniques.

In order to exemplify the cogency of the model in pattern and reply how and why car manufacturers design their MCS. we perform an in deepness instance survey of the dealingss between a installation ( VCG ) of the international OEM Volvo Cars and a choice of its first-tier provider installations. The instance survey provides considerable grounds of three supplier types. viz. batch. low value-added just-in-sequence and high value-added just-in-sequence providers. visualising the associations in the model between eventualities. hazards and direction controls.

These controls include both formal and informal techniques. of which trust edifice and societal force per unit area are extremely valued. Most notably. VCG’s structured supplier squad maps as a kin and establishes informal control among take parting providers. which strengthens control on the OEM’s dyadic provider dealingss. As our model draws on instance findings from other less formal IORs. it seems that our instance findings offer more grounds of their external cogency. That manner. the findings contradict that informal controls play a minor function in automotive MSRs.

In peculiar. VCG’s MCS. uniting both formal and informal controls. is argued to be designed specifically to better supply public presentation. The balance of this paper is organized as follows. In the 2nd portion. we develop the theoretical eventuality model. The 3rd portion describes the instance research methodological analysis. The 4th portion is the existent instance survey. which presents VCG. describes three supplier types by agencies of eventuality degrees and clarifies how VCG designed the MCS regulating them.

In the 5th portion. we discuss our findings by comparing VCG’s direction control with old findings and lucubrating on the significance of VCG’s provider squad. We conclude the paper with a sum-up of the chief findings and some avenues for farther research. 6 2. Theoretical model In this portion. we develop a theoretical eventuality model for MCS design of MSRs. which can be found in figure I. & gt ; Contingency theory originated with the purpose of explicating the construction of organisations by peculiar fortunes.

Subsequently. direction accounting research workers adopted and further developed the theory in order to explicate the form of MCSs in organisations ( e. g. Chenhall. 2003 ; Luft & A ; Shields. 2003 ) . Therefore. eventuality theory suits this survey. sing MCS design of MSRs and its explicative variables. The cardinal construct of the model is the degree of hazard a certain MSR runs. Inter-organizational direction control theory proposes two types of hazard. which consequence from five different situational ancestors. qualifying the MSR.

Although we clarify both hazard types individually. we stress the integrative reading of all eventualities jointly finding both degrees of hazard. Subsequently. this hazard is governed by different direction control instruments. either with a big or a little function for informal control. 3 2. 1. Performance hazard The first hazard type is public presentation hazard. defined as the chance of non accomplishing the MSR aims. despite satisfactory cooperation ( Das & A ; Teng. 2001 ) .

This type of hazard is besides referred to as “coordination requirements” ( Dekker. 2004 ; Gulati & A ; Singh. 1998 ) or “the command of events” ( Tomkins. 2001 ) . As the MSR nonsubjective concerns fabricating as many merchandises of the order book as possible. on clip. with good quality at the lowest possible cost. public presentation hazard is the hazard of a supply concatenation break upseting the realization of this end. Three eventualities related to engineering addition this hazard. viz. complexness. undertaking uncertainness and undertaking mutuality ( Chenhall. 2003 ) .

Yet as complexness and undertaking uncertainness are extremely related ( Chenhall. 2003 ) . the model does non include complexness individually ( cf Dekker. 2004 ) . 3 Harmonizing to van Veen-Dirks ( 2006 ) . all situational features and MCS features are determined jointly alternatively of consecutive. Besides Kamminga & A ; van der Meer-Kooistra ( 2007 ) propose that the influence of eventualities is non determined by each ancestor as such. but by their interaction. In add-on. they suggest analyzing control as an integrative construct. in which all control dimensions are incorporated.

Consequently. we do non suggest one-on-one associations between one specific eventuality. one specific type of hazard and one specific type of control. suggested to accommodate that hazard type. Alternatively. our theoretical account at the same time surveies the associations between situational eventualities. hazards and direction control techniques. as put frontward by the three boxes of figure I. The boxes of eventualities and hazards are put together to emphasize their mutuality and joint impact on direction control.

7 Task uncertainness relates to variableness in transmutation undertakings and the available cognition of methods for executing those undertakings ( Chenhall. 2003 ) . This situational characteristic determines the quantifiability trouble of end product and activities ( Kamminga & A ; van der Meer-Kooistra. 2007 ; van der MeerKooistra & A ; Vosselman. 2000 ) . which increases with increasing degrees of complexness of both the delivered merchandise and its operational procedures ( Woodward. 1965 ) .

The first complexness is related to the added value of the merchandise and bit by bit increases depending on whether the provider delivers a standard constituent or an of import customized faculty ( Cooper & A ; Slagmulder. 2004 ) . The 2nd complexness regards the added value of the production procedure and reflects the complexness of the supplier’s fabrication processes needed to efficaciously bring forth and present merchandises as required. Task mutuality refers to the grade to which subactivities of the value creative activity procedure have been split up and made dependant on each other ( Dekker. 2004 ) .

In MSRs. this mutuality is consecutive ( Thompson. 1967 ) 4. because the relation involves reassigning the supplier’s end product to the manufacturer’s input procedure. The degree of consecutive mutuality is impacted by the dependance degree of the manufacturer’s operational public presentation on the supply quality ( timeliness and merchandise quality ) . Furthermore. the mutuality degree of a specific MSR is influenced by the production flexibleness required from both parties and the manufacturer’s deficiency of precise cognition to execute activities antecedently done in-house.

2. 2. Relational hazard The 2nd type of hazard is relational hazard. connoting the chance of non holding satisfactory cooperation because of timeserving behavior of the provider. exemplified in fiddling. rip offing. falsifying information and appropriating resources ( Das and Teng. 2001 ) . This type of hazard is besides referred to as “appropriation concerns” ( Dekker. 2004 ; Gulati & A ; Singh. 1998 ) or “the coevals of trust” ( Tomkins. 2001 ) .

Transaction cost economic sciences ( TCE ) theory5 proposes three eventualities that influence relational hazard and later find appropriate control: plus specificity. environmental uncertainness and dealing frequence ( Williamson. 1979 ) . Yet. as the maker possesses no specific assets related to a certain provider. at 4 Thompson ( 1967 ) identifies three degrees of undertaking mutuality from low to high. which influence the degree of inter-organisational coordination and communicating: pooled. consecutive and mutual mutuality.

5 TCE argues that parties are merely boundedly rational and act opportunistically. Therefore. the entire cost of outsourcing is the amount of both the supplied constituent costs and the dealing costs. including costs for dialogue. pulling up contracts. coordination. control and hazard of timeserving behavior ( van der Meer-Kooistra & A ; Vosselman. 2000 ) . 8 least non in the fabrication stage of the supply concatenation. there is no lock-in to supplier timeserving behavior.

6 Hence. unlike uncertainness and dealing frequence. plus specificity does non act upon supplier timeserving behavior in MSRs and is non included in our theoretical model. Consistent with being a cardinal eventuality research construct. environmental uncertainness besides forms a powerful feature of MSRs ( Chenhall. 2003 ) . In peculiar. this eventuality relates to general market uncertainnesss and uncertainness about unknown hereafter eventualities ( Kamminga & A ; van der Meer-Kooistra. 2007 ; Langfield-Smith & A ; Smith. 2003 ; van der Meer-Kooistra & A ; Vosselman. 2000 ) .

Because maker and provider interact under these uncertainnesss. both parties face alterations over clip. which require elaborate contracts ( Dekker. 2004 ) . However. uncomplete contract theory argues that there exist restrictions in pulling up complete contracts. because all future eventualities can non be foreseen. are excessively expensive to anticipate or are excessively expensive or impossible to contract upon ( Gietzmann. 1996 ) . Consequently. the combination of uncertainness and uncomplete contracts leads to possible timeserving behavior of the provider.

Harmonizing to TCE. more frequent interactions lower the possibility of timeserving behavior ( Williamson. 1979 ) . So. to continue a positive relation between eventualities and relational hazard. we could use rarity as eventuality variable ( e. g. Anderson & A ; Dekker. 2005 ) . Yet. as we study MSRs with no connexion to commercial dialogues finding the contract term. we include the antecedent relational stableness purpose. This eventuality relates to the manufacturer’s purpose of continued future interactions with the provider and serves to construct bilateral committedness ( Cooper & A ; Slagmulder. 2004 ) .

We argue that MSRs. in which relational stableness is considered necessary and therefore aspired by the maker. are capable to higher relational hazard. For illustration. if supplier shift costs are high due to high mutuality. high committedness from the maker could motivate the provider to accept lower quality or bringing public presentation. Besides including a dealing environment feature and a dealing characteristic. we besides incorporate a dealing party characteristic ( Langfield-Smith & A ; Smith. 2003 ; van der Meer-Kooistra & A ; Vosselman. 2000 ) .

In peculiar. we include supplier cognition importance. which encompasses the grade of importance for the maker to cognize the provider and to be able to measure features. such as direction competency. trustiness and willingness to portion proprietary cognition. Normally. this sort of appraisal is done by agencies of first-hand or second-hand experience. Hence. we argue that when the 6 Obviously. providers do hold specific assets in topographic point. rendering them vulnerable to timeserving behavior from the portion of the maker.

However. this survey and the developed theoretical model merely concentrate on provider timeserving behavior. 9 importance of provider cognition rises. the hazard for insufficient or erroneous appraisal and subsequent provider timeserving behavior additions. 2. 3. Management control system Although MCSs have been conceptualised and categorised in assorted ways. the current direction control literature has reached a consensus on two types of direction controls. viz. formal and informal control instruments ( Langfield-Smith & A ; Smith. 2003 ) .

Obviously. analyzing the use of informal controls compared to formal controls requires both control types to be included in the theoretical model. Formal controls are explicitly set up to organize the MSR and include outcome controls and behavior controls. Outcome control involves the measuring and rating of the results of operations against pre-defined results or marks. by utilizing several public presentation measuring techniques ( Ouchi. 1979 ; Dekker. 2004 ) . The most of import result prosodies for MSRs are per centum of defects. quality of delivered goods and on clip bringing of goods ( Gunasekaran. Patel & A ; McGaughey. 2004 ) .

Behavioural control concerns the specification and existent surveillance of behavior. by agencies of regulations and criterion processs ( Ouchi. 1979 ) . Additionally. behaviour control includes measuring conformity with pre-specified planning. processs. regulations and ordinances ( Dekker. 2004 ) . Informal controls ( besides called societal controls ) are non explicitly designed. but are grown out of shared norms and values. shaped by frequent interaction. meetings and direction attitude ( Ouchi. 1979 ; Merchant. 1998 ) . Particularly trust building7 has emerged as a really of import informal control instrument in inter-organizational MCSs ( e. g. Dekker. 2004 ) .

While formal controls cut down the hazard by changing the inducements for underperformance and timeserving behavior. trust mitigates hazard by minimising the fright of underperformance and timeserving behavior to happen ( Das and Teng 2001 ) . Therefore. we include three types of inter-organizational trust edifice. viz. constructing contractual trust. competency trust and good will trust ( Sako. 1992 ) . 8 Contractual trust consequences from old contractual dealingss or grows during the MSR 7 Rousseau. Sitkin. Burt & A ; Camerer ( 1998. p. 394 ) .

Define trust as “a psychological province consisting the purpose to accept exposure. based upon positive outlooks of the purposes or behavior of another” . Harmonizing to them “trust is non a behavior ( cooperation ) . or a pick ( e. g. taking a hazard ) . but an implicit in psychological status that can do or ensue from such actions” ( Rousseau et al. . 1998. p. 395 ; italics added ) .

As such. trust in itself can non be a control instrument in the MCS of MSRs. Alternatively. the control techniques are the actions the maker performs to make and construct trust in the provider. 8 Contractual trust is based on the outlook that the provider will maintain promises and comply with understandings made. whether these10 ( Sako. 1992 ) .

Competence trust is increased by old good public presentation. i. e. good quality and bringing consequences. Furthermore. competency trust consequences from purchasing activities from reputable providers or reassigning competencies to the provider. Additionally. merchandise and/or procedure enfranchisement and procedure standardization enhance competency trust ( Sako. 1992 ) . To develop goodwill trust. Sako ( 1992 ) identifies shared values and norms as necessary. but deficient. as dealing parties besides need to demo the willingness to be indebted to each other.

Gulati ( 1995 ) stresses making and turning an inter-organizational bond of friendly relationship to trip goodwill trust ( Gulati. 1995 ) . Other possible good will trust instigators are synergistic end puting. trustworthiness repute and a long term relationship ( Dekker. 2004 ) . Following to these specific trust edifice mechanisms. the literature besides proposes an of import overall trust edifice technique. viz. close interaction. based on common involvements and established by agencies of joint determination devising and joint job work outing via a joint relationship board and/or joint undertaking groups ( Das & A ; Teng. 2001 ; Dekker. 2004 ) .

9 Besides trust edifice. MSRs can be governed by another type of informal control. which Ouchi ( 1979 ) refers to as kin control. Based on shared norms. values and a common inter-organizational end. supplier behavior in the involvement of the MSR will be reinforced. because providers are motivated to accomplish the end ( Das & A ; Teng. 2001 ) . This incentive consequences from inter-organisational societal force per unit area ( Spekle. 2001 ) exerted by the maker. which we believe is societal control in its actual significance.

Because of high mutuality between maker and provider. below standard consequences of the provider straight impact the manufacturer’s public presentation. Consequently. provider direction is unpleasantly confronted with maker direction and faces personal humiliation because of the mistake. Additionally. provider direction runs the hazard of their repute and personal relationship with interacting maker direction acquiring injured. Besides Dyer & A ; Singh ( 1998 ) reference repute and personal dealingss as societal control mechanisms. besides norms and trust.

By moving as negatively valued societal countenances ( Bijlsma- are contractually stipulated or non. Competence trust concerns the outlook that the provider possesses the necessary proficient and managerial competencies to present the order as agreed. Goodwill trust respects the outlook that the supplier portions an unfastened committedness. with the willingness to execute activities good to the MSR. but perchance neither in the supplier’s involvement nor required by the contract ( Sako. 1992 ) . 9 Other potency overall trust edifice techniques in a MSR are communicating via regular inter-organizational meetings ( Chalos & A ;

O’Connor. 2004 ; Das & A ; Teng. 2001 ) . information sharing of job countries ( Chalos & A ; O’Connor. 2004 ) . provider development activities ( Carr & A ; Ng. 1995 ) . networking ( Das & A ; Teng. 2001 ) . preparation ( Chalos & A ; O’Connor. 2004 ) and the extent to which the employees of both parties understand the factors guaranting the collaboration’s hereafter success ( Chalos & A ; O’Connor. 2004 ) . 11 Frankema & A ; Costa. 2005 ) . these societal effects create inducements for satisfactory provider public presentation and render provider self-interest difficult to prolong ( Spekle. 2001 ) .

If we assume operational snags to be day-today concern in MSRs. this societal force per unit area creates an informal agencies to extenuate hazard in MSRs. 3. Research methodological analysis 3. 1. Case study research The empirical portion of this paper is based on an in deepness instance survey. which is an probe of a existent life phenomenon. trusting on multiple beginnings of grounds and benefiting from anterior development of theoretical propositions ( Yin. 1994 ) . This research method suits our research that concerns polishing bing interorganizational direction control theory for the comparatively under-explored fabricating stage of the supply concatenation.

10 Harmonizing to Keating ( 1995 ) . such theory polish needs a clear theoretical get downing point. supplemented with openness to the find of unexpected findings. To equilibrate these theory fond regard and withdrawal demands. we developed a theoretical model to steer the informations aggregation. but at the same clip used informations aggregation techniques leting sufficient openness. Furthermore. several interorganizational direction control instance surveies ( e. g. Cooper & A ; Slagmulder. 2004 ; Dekker. 2004 ; Kamminga & A ; van der Meer-Kooistra. 2007 ;

Nicholson et Al. . 2006 ) strengthen the statement that instances allow look intoing in item the construction and act uponing variables of IORs ( Sartorius & A ; Kirsten. 2005 ) . These surveies show that theory polish of MCS design can be adequately investigated by agencies of qualitative research. The societal significance of inter-organizational MCSs. particularly sing the usage and reading of informal controls. and the subsequent behavior of companies and employees is really complex.

So if we merely skim the surface. we will ne’er detect how different parties interpret certain IORs and whether the MCS is designed consequently. This statement non merely justifies the pick for a instance survey. but besides forms the ground 10 Our research corresponds to look intoing a complex phenomenon within its existent life context of which empirical grounds is instead limited. and replying how and why inquiries about this phenomenon. for which instance survey research is most suitable ( Eisenhardt. 1989 ; Yin. 1994 ) .

Furthermore. Keating ( 1995 ) argues that instance surveies suit three ends and that our theory polish end represents the in-between land between theory find ( depicting novel phenomena ) and theory defense ( disconfirming good specified theories by conveying in negative grounds ) . More specifically. our instance research is of the theory illustration type. documenting “previously thankless facets of direction accounting practice” and placing “aspects of the illustrated theory that require reformulation or more strict specification” ( Keating. 1995. p. 71 ) .

Indeed. the end of this survey is to exemplify how makers design supplier MCSs. to what extent this design differs from designs in other IORs and how the design can be explained by agencies of a specifically altered theoretical model. 12 why more of this research is requested ( e. g. Langfield-Smith & A ; Smith. 2003 ; Dekker. 2004 ; van der MeerKooistra & A ; Vosselman. 2006 ) . 3. 2. Unit of measurement of analysis In most inter-organizational surveies. the unit of analysis is one dyadic relation between two independent parties ( van der Meer-Kooistra & A ; Vosselman. 2006 ) .

Since there exist different dyadic MSRs within one maker and we study MCS’s dependance on relationship eventualities. our unit of analysis consists of specific MSRs. Dyer & A ; Singh ( 1998 ) explicitly propose the “relational view” . concentrating on the buyer-supplier couple. as opposed to the “industry construction view” and “resource based view” . when analysing concerted scheme and beginnings of inter-organizational competitory advantage. In order to reply the proposed research inquiries refering MSR MCS design. we analyzed all dealingss after the maker had decided to outsource the fabrication activities.

In other words. we addressed neither the make-or-buy determination nor related commercial dialogues. but collected informations from the start of production onwards. Furthermore. we merely gathered informations on standard MCSs for MSRs with good operational public presentation. 3. 3. Case company choice The choice of the instance company and its providers was influenced by two choice concerns: theoretical sampling ( Eisenhardt. 1989 ) . and unfastened and flexible entree to.